RECENT CASES

There has been a curious reluctance on the part of some courts to effectuate
the intent of the testator,'26 as in the instant case, contrary to the well-recognized
rule favoring charitable trusts.2 7 Some recent decisions, in contradistinction to
the principal case, indicate an encouraging trend toward the carrying out of the
intent of the testator, even in the absence of apt words,2 and even when the
purpose had not theretofore been deemed charitable.2 9 The Arizona court said
that it would attempt to carry out the intent of the testatrix, but not to the extent of writing a new will for her. However, by defeating the clear intent of the
testatrix, the court did write a new will, contrary both to good law and good
sense.
1

LIMITATIONS ON POWERS OF SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE
An original testamentary trustee, a brother of the testator, was vested with
discretionary powers to rent, sell, or lease any property without court order, to
choose any investment without being restricted to "legals,"' to provide by will
for a successor trustee, and generally to "do any and all things that he may deem
necessary, or that I might do were I living." The trustee was to pay a stated
monthly income to the testator's wife for life, and the balance of the income
was to be used by him for personal purposes. At the death of the testator's wife,
the entire property was to pass to the original trustee's children. Suit was
brought under the Georgia Declaratory Judgment Act 2 to determine what
powers the plaintiff, as successor trustee named in the original trustee's will,
could exercise in the management and control of the estate. The court held that
the successor trustee may not exercise the same powers conferred by will upon
the original trustee, because the powers in question were personal and discretionary. Gilmore v. Gilmore)
The Supreme Court of Georgia, although recognizing that the intention of
the testator must be the controlling factor in determining the powers of a successor trustee, 4 refused to go beyond the "plain and unambiguous" language of
Clayton v. Hallett, 30 Colo. 231, 70 Pac. 429 (i9o2). As to definiteness of beneficiaries, see
Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1935) C. 41, § 184.
"Woodcock v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 214 N.C. 224, igg S.E. 20 (1938). See also
14 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 686 (1947), noting Porter v. Bayn~rd, 28 So. 2d 890 (Fla., 1946).
'7 Gossett v. Swinney, 53 F. 2d 772 (C.C.A. 8th, I93i); Walker v. Central Tr. &Say. Bank,
318 Ill. 253, 149 N.E. 234 (1925). But see In re Kline's Estate, 138 Cal. App. 514, 32 P. 2d 677

(1934).
18Funk Estate, 353 Pa. 321, 45 A. 2d 67 (1946); Mitchell v. Reeves, 123 Conn. 549, i96
Ati. 785 (1938).
9 Cochran v. McLaughlin, 128 Conn. 638, 24 A. 2d 836 (1942); Nixon v. Brown, 46 Nev.
439, 214 Pac. 524 (1923); Dulles's Estate, 218 Pa. i62, 67 Atl. 49 (1907).
Ga. Code (1933) § 108-417.
'Ga. L. (x945) 137-39.
341 S.E. 2d 229 (Ga., 1947).
43 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 553 (1935); 2 Scott, Trusts § 196 (1939).
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the instrument to interpret this intent, s and declared that when the original
trustee's powers are discretionary they may not be exercised by successor trustees. This approach differs sharply from that of most jurisdictions, which hold
that when there is no express provision in the trust instrument, the intention of
the testator must be extracted from
the language itself, interpreted in the light
6
of all surrounding circumstances.
Many of the earlier cases, including those cited by the Georgia Court,7 followed the principle that where the exercise of a power is at the discretion of the
trustee, the power does not pass to a successor trustee unless the testator indicated a contrary intention.8 However, the recent decisions show a tendency to
allow even broad discretionary powers to be exercised by a successor if there is
some standard by which the court can test the reasonableness of the trustee's
judgment,9 or where the power in question relates only to the business administration of the trust.' ° A few courts allow discretionary powers to pass to a successor, even though no such standard is present, as in cases where the discretion
concerns the extent of the interests of the various beneficiaries."
Many earlier decisions held that discretionary powers were personal to a
named trustee, but that they attached to the office when the instrument merely
gave the power to "my trustee" or to "the trustees." 2 However, little attention
is now paid to such minute differences in wording. 3 Furthermore, it is clear that
5Gilmore v. Gilmore, 41 S.E. 2d

229, 234

(Ga., 1947).

6 Doe v. Ettenheim, 232 Wis. 34, 285 N.W. 764 (1939); In re White's Will, 135 N.Y. Misc.
377, 238 N.Y. Supp. 559 (1929); Watling v. Watling, 27 F. 2d 193 (C.C.A. 6th, 1928); Jacobs

v. Wilmington Trust Co., 9 Del. Ch. 4oo, 8o AtI. 346 (1911).
7 "A discretionary power to sell can be exercised only by the trustee upon whom it is
originally conferred." Luquire v. Lee, 121 Ga. 624, 626, 49 S.E. 834, 836 (1905). "It [power
conferred on original trustee] was discretionary in its nature, and therefore one which would
not pass to a successor." Simmons v. McKinlock, 98 Ga. 738, 739, 26 S.E. 88, 89 (1896);
Maynard v. Greer, 129 Ga. 709, 59 S.E. 798 (1907); Henderson v. Williams, 97 Ga. 709, 25
S.E. 395 (1896); Freeman v. Prendergast, 94 Ga. 369, 21 S.E. 837 (1894).
8Tilley v. Letcher, 2o3 Ala. 277, 82 So. 527 (i919); Chandler v. Chandler, iii Miss. 525,
71 So. 8i (1916); Snyder v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 93 Md. 225, 48 Ati. 719 (i901).
9 2 Scott, Trusts § i96 (ig39); see In re Kuntz' Will, 16o N.Y. Misc. 856, 290 N.Y. Supp.
867 (1936); Boyden v. Stevens, 285 Mass. 176, I88 N.E. 741 (1934).
"0Anderson v. Ratliff, 297 Ky. 42, 178 S.W. 2d 946 (i944); Penn v. Pennsylvania Co. for
Insurance on Lives and Granting Annuities, 294 Ky. 271, 171 S.W. 2d 437 (1943); Upton v.
White, 92 N.H. 221, 29 A. 2d 126 (1942); Wilmington Trust Co. v. Worth, 1g Del. Ch. 314,
167 Atl. 848 (1933); Reese v. Ivey, 162 Ala. 448, 50 So. 223 (1909).

"Bray v. Old National Bank, 113 Ind. App. 506, 48 N.E. 2d 846 (I943); In re Gude's
Estate, i56 N.Y. Misc. 154, 28o N.Y. Supp. 703 (I935); Smith v. Floyd, 193 N.Y. 683, 87
N.E. 1127 (i9o8); see Matter of Fox, 292 N.Y. 19, 53 N.E. 2d 378 (1944).

"2Striker v. Daly, 223 N.Y. 468, iig N.E. 882 (1918); Taylor v. Monmonier, 120 Md. io,
87 Atl. 513 (1913); Burtis v. Trowbridge, 142 App. Div. 449, 126 N.Y. Supp. uoi (i9il);
Boutelle v. City Savings Bank, 17 R.I. 181, 24 Atl. 838 (1892).
13".... Little regard is now paid to such minute differences as those between 'my trustees,'
'my trustee, A. and B.' and 'A. and B. my trustee': the testator's reliance on the individual to
the exclusion of the holders of the office for the time being must be expressed in clear and apt
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a power is generally not held personal merely because the testator stated his
confidence in the judgment of the trustee, for a trustee is always chosen for that
reason.' 4 Nor will the fact that the original trustee is a close relative of the testator be regarded as decisive evidence that the testator intended the power to be
personal.'5
The facts involved in the instant case presented an excellent opportunity for
the Georgia Court to reverse its prior decisions, based solely on the distinction
between discretionary and mandatory powers, and to embrace the generally
accepted view that discretionary powers are not personal, unless there is clear
proof evidencing a contrary intent.16 The powers in question were powers of sale
and investment, involving only the business administration of the estate, and
the trustee's discretion was subject to comparison with established business
standards.17 Moreover, the relative ages of the beneficiary and the original
trustee indicate that the testator must have realized that the necessity for the
exercise of discretion might, in the normal course of events, arise at a time when
the original trustee was not in office, and courts frequently have held, under
these conditions, that the powers attach to the office of trustee. 8 The fact that
the testator expressly gave the original trustee the power to appoint a successor, coupled with the fact that the trust property was ultimately to pass to
the children of the original trustee, is further evidence of the testator's intention
to permit the designated successor to exercise the powers granted the original
trustee. However, by refusing to permit the successor to exercise the discretionary powers, the cost of management and control of the estate was increased to
the detriment of its ultimate owner, the original trustee's child.
language." In re Smith, [19o4] i Ch. 139, 144; cf. Cooley v. Kelley, 52 Ind.App. 687, 98 N.E.
653 (1912); Parker v. Sears, 117 Mass. 513 (1875).
14 Doe v. Ettenheim, 232 Wis. 34, 285 N.W. 764 (i939); Booth v. Krug, 368 Ill. 487, 14
N.E. 2d 645 (1938). It is generally agreed that the naming of a corporate trustee shows that the
testator did not intend the power to be personal. City National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago
v. Bairstow, 319 Ill.
App. 632, 50 N.E. 2d I1 (1943); In re Boutwell's Estate, 112 Vt. 159,
22 A. 2d 157 (1941); In re Jenkins' Estate, iii N.Y. Misc. 517, 18i N.Y. Supp. 585 (i92o).
IsIn re City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 64 N.Y.S. 2d 523 (1946) (A discretionary power conferred by a testator on an original trustee, her husband, to invest in non-legals survives in the
absence of an express provision to the contrary). Many cases have held the close family relationship between the testator and the original trustee indicative of an intention on the part of
the testator that the powers conferred be personal. Young v. Young, 97 N.C. 132, 2 S.E. 78
(1887); Security Co. v. Snow, 70 Conn. 288,39 Atl. 153 (i898); Hinson v. Williamson, 74 Ala.
i8o (x883). But see Wilmington Trust Co. v. Jacobs, 9 Del. Ch.77, 77 Atl. 78 (191o); Gosson

v. Ladd, 77 Ala. 223 (1884).
A 3 Bogert, Trust and Trustees § 553 (1935); 2 Scott, Trusts § 196 (i939); Restatement of
Trusts § 196 (i935); Uniform Trusts Act § o (1937).
17 Authorities cited note iosupra.
18In re Fox' Estate, 292 N.Y. 19, 53 N.E. 2d 378 ('944); In re Kronson's Will, 14o N.Y.
Misc. 102, 249 N.Y. Supp. 781 (1931); In re Storts' Estate, 142 N.Y. Misc. 54, 253 N.Y. Supp.
834 (Sur. Ct., 1931); In re Detre's Estate, 273 Pa. 341, 117 AtI. S4 (1922); Mercer v. Safe
Deposit & Trust Co., 91 Md. 102, 45 Atl. 865 (igoo).
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Little justification can be found for the continued application of the Georgia
rule. It is clearly contrary to the tenor of the great majority of judicial decisions
in the field, and several states have adopted statutes liberalizing the passage of
powers to successor trustees. x9 These decisions and statutes seem to be based
on the realization that the "normal" powers granted to a trustee are intended to
attach to the office,2° and that as a practical matter, a testator rarely desires the,
exercise of a power to be limited to the life or incumbency of one particular
trustee.2 ' The application of the minority rule may result in some added protection for the beneficiaries, but this protection is likely to be more than offset by
the more rapid depletion of the trust corpus because of the necessity for successors to obtain court approval for their acts.

VIOLATION OF ILLINOIS ELECTION CODE AS
CIVIL CONTEMPT
Under a section of the Illinois election code, election judges and clerks are
made officers of the court and are liable "in a proceeding for contempt for any
misbehavior in their office, to be tried in open court on oral testimony in a summary way, without formal pleadings ..... " In the recent case of People ex rel.
Rusch v. Fusco,2 the state Supreme Court reaffirmed its original construction of
this provision that a proceeding under the statute is one for civil contempt and is
to be tried under applicable rules of civil procedure.
Those accused of violating the statute in question are usually charged with
falsifying election returns and/or acquiescing in the falsification of these returns.
In the vast majority of jurisdictions that offense, if committed by a court officer,
would be considered a criminal contempt. Most courts treat any contempt committed by an o~cer of the court, whether in the presence of the court or not, as
of a criminal nature unless the punishment is inflicted for the benefit of one of
the parties.3 Similarly, courts consider as criminal a contempt defined by a stat19Mich. Stat. Ann. (Henderson, 1937) § 26.74; Me. Rev. Stat. (i944) c. 147 § 6; Mass.
Ann. Laws (i933) c. 203 § 6; R.I. Gen. Laws (1938) c. 486 § 5; Wis. Stat. (Brossard, 1943)
§ 231.28; Va. Code Ann. (Michie, x942) § 6298a; Tex. Ann. Rev. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1939)
Art. 7425b-4o.
20 3 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 553 (i935).

21

Ibid.

1 Ill. Rev. Stat. (i945) c. 46, § 14-5.
274 N.E. 2d 531 (Ill., 1947).
3Butterfield v. Nebraska, i44 Neb. 388, 13 N.W. 2d 572 (1944); United States v. Ford;
9 F. 2d 990 (D.C. Mont., 1925); Ex parte Clark, 208 Mo. 121, io6 S.W. 990 (i9o7); State v.
District Court, 5I Mont, 337, 152 Pac. 475 (19,5); cf. Howard v. Gulf C. & S.F.R. Co., 135
S.W. 707 (Tex. Civ. App., i911). The Illinois decisions are in accord with this rule except as
regards the election officials who are made officers of the court by the statute in question. In
re Kelly's Estate, 365 Ill. 174, 6 N.E. 2d 113 (1937); People v. Andalman,346 Ill. 149, 178
N.E. 412 (1932); People v. Seymour, 272 Ill. 295, iii N.E. ioo8 (1916).

